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## Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD2794, F-16 SECURITY NOTES: REQUEST FOR TWO SPECIFIC

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#07ISLAMABAD2794**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">07ISLAMABAD2794</a>	<a href="#">2007-06-22 13:25</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Islamabad</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/wikileaks-us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem/201017>  
<http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem-108985>

VZCZCXRO3246  
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW  
DE RUEHIL #2794/01 1731325  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 221325Z JUN 07  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0072  
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 2641  
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0215  
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0166  
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 4264  
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY  
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 7234  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5889  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1217  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4952  
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 3375  
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 6499  
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 2696  
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1101  
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2548  
RUEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017

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SUBJECT: F-16 SECURITY NOTES: REQUEST FOR TWO SPECIFIC CHANGES THAT WILL BENEFIT COALITION OPERATIONS.

Classified By: Charge Peter Bodde 1.5 (b), (d).

¶1. (C) Pakistan's September 2006 agreement to purchase 18 new F-16 aircraft marked an important milestone in our alliance. The agreement signaled Pakistan's and the United States' intent to continue strengthening our security relationship. We are grateful for both State's and DoD's enormous efforts to facilitate both this sale and the separate transfer of Excess Defense Article F-16s.

#### SECURITY ISSUES

¶2. (C) For the sake of our own national security, as well as to safeguard the long-term viability of our security assistance relationship with Pakistan, maintaining the security of technology related to F-16s is preeminently important. We understand and support most of the security notes that accompany the September 2006 Letter of Offer and Acceptance for new F-16s. That said, we believe two specific provisions of the security notes will harm Pakistan's operational effectiveness and may negatively impact Coalition operations in Afghanistan.

¶3. (C) Paragraph 9 of the security notes place two unusual requirements on Pakistan:

--The F-16 Aircraft, armaments, and related equipment and technical data must be housed on separate pre-designated Pakistan Air Force bases to ensure no unauthorized access. Furthermore, Pakistan may not have non-U.S./non-Pakistan origin aircraft or personnel at any of the bases with these F-16 aircraft and related equipment.

--No foreign units or personnel may be permanently or temporarily assigned at the bases where F-16 aircraft are assigned, parked, maintained, or stored, or while deployed.

¶4. (C) Post understands the importance of ensuring that non-Pakistani, non-U.S. personnel do not have access to restricted U.S. technology. That said, requiring separate bases for the F-16s does not necessarily further this goal beyond what would be possible using other techniques. Indeed, restricting the access of Pakistani-owned foreign aircraft to F-16 bases does not directly correlate to restricting the access of foreign nationals to those bases. Meanwhile, the above-noted restrictions could cause serious humanitarian, safety, logistical, and operational difficulties for Pakistan. Not incidentally, the requirement that third countries, including our NATO allies, be denied access to special F-16 bases could impede our own operational effectiveness.

¶5. (C) We note that:

--Pakistan's search and rescue helicopters are primarily of Russian and French origin. Some of Pakistan's air lift capacity is European-manufactured Casa 235s. If Pakistan cannot base these aircraft with the F-16s, Pakistani personnel (and U.S. trainers) could be unnecessarily endangered. At the very least, operational effectiveness would be hurt by lack of access to Casa 235 capabilities.

--Not allowing foreign units or personnel to deploy to F-16 bases would deny non-U.S. Coalition aircraft operating in Afghanistan access to those facilities. Such a policy would be counterproductive to our interests in the region. Similarly, our Long War needs require Pakistan to be flexible

in its deployment capabilities. Restricting Pakistan's access to its own bases would limit this flexibility, as would denying Pakistan access to Coalition bases outside of Pakistan.

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--The basing restrictions prevent Pakistan from launching a unified strike package of U.S. and non-U.S. aircraft from a single air base. As pre-mission briefings are essential to safety and effectiveness, this would be a serious handicap for the Pakistan Air Force.

--Currently, all Pakistan Air Force fighter pilots train employment tactics at a single air base. Under the F-16 security restrictions, F-16 pilots would be required to train at a separate facility, an expensive and inefficient proposition.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

16. (C) In light of the potential for paragraph 9 of the current security notes to adversely impact both Pakistan's and the United States' operational effectiveness, we propose that the note be changed so that the F-16s can be stored in "separate but co-located" portions of existing air bases. Under such a plan, the U.S. would establish stringent requirements for the foundation and maintenance of "separate but co-located" basing facilities for the F-16s. We believe that, so long as the U.S. ensures adequate attention to detail as we establish requirements for co-located facilities, we could ensure as much security for our technology as at a dedicated air base.

#### 17. (C) Other recommendations:

--There should be a waiver process for more of the F-16 security requirements. Currently, many of the requirements can only be waived or changed by amending the Letter of Offer and Acceptance. A waiver requiring "the written permission of the Department of State" is available for some of the requirements; we believe it would be appropriate for many of the others. Authorizing such waivers would enable Coalition or third country (NATO ally) access to bases during humanitarian emergencies and other urgent situations.

--The U.S. should begin security training regarding the F-16 program as soon as possible. The more Pakistani personnel familiar with security requirements at an early date, the better.

BODDE